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PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
The system of governance in the United States is a dynamic one.
Power is divided between the federal and state governments, and then
further divided between the three branches of the Federal Government
itself 1 At the most basic level within the Federal Government, the
Legislature creates the law,2 the Executive enforces the law,3 and the
Judiciary interprets the law.4 Each has its own roles and responsibilities
within that framework, but each is nonetheless interdependent.5 Nearly
any action of one branch implicates the roles and responsibilities of all
branches. This Comment will analyze a specific instance of one branch's
action that implicates the roles of all: a suspect provision of an
appropriations bill passed by the legislature that may affect the roles and
duties of not only the legislature itself, but also the judiciary, and, most
importantly, the executive as well.
The focus of this Comment arises out of the controversial
conviction and incarceration of two Border Patrol Agents and subsequent
action taken by the United States House of Representatives to right the
perceived wrong concerning that conviction. In short, the two agents,
Ignacio Ramos and Jose Alonso Compean, were convicted of various
criminal charges after the shooting of a Mexican national who was
illegally attempting to enter into the United States.6 The House of
Representatives responded to this incident by passing an appropriations
bill amendment that essentially decreed no funds will be made available
1. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1-4
(Vickie Been et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2006).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives."); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 910 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
legislative as "[o]f or relating to lawmaking or to the power to enact laws").
3. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States."); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining executive as "[t]he branch of government responsible for effecting and
enforcing laws").
4. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I ("The judicial power of the United States, shall be
vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish."); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)
(This is a landmark case that established the role of the judiciary in constitutional
interpretation. "It is empathically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the
law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule.").
5. See LouIs FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER, CONGRESS AND THE
EXECUTIVE 3 (Texas A&M University Press, 4th ed. 1998).
6. Information Issued by U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Texas on
Sept. 8: Response of Government to Reporting Inaccuracies Regarding Compean, Ramos
Prosecution, U.S. FED NEWS, Sept 8, 2006 [hereinafter Response of Government].
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to incarcerate the two patrolmen.7 This legislation could, depending
upon how it is construed, directly affect a power reserved solely to the
executive branch: the power to grant pardons.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Incident
In February of 2005, Ignacio Ramos and Jose Alonso Compean
were working as United States Border Patrol Agents at the United
States/Mexico border.8 In performing their duties, the two officers
observed a van near the border.9 The driver of the van, Osvaldo Aldrete-
Davila, a Mexican national, jumped out of the van and attempted to
abscond by foot back to Mexico instead of yielding to the agents'
commands for him to stop.1° As Aldrete-Davila attempted to escape,
Ramos and Compean both drew their service weapons and confronted
him." According to the trial testimony of both Ramos and Compean,
Aldrete-Davila was not holding a gun; in fact, he was not visibly armed
at all.' 2 Despite that fact, the agents fired their weapons at Aldrete-
Davila as he ran back toward the Mexican border. 3 Compean fired his
gun at least 14 times and Ramos fired once. 14 Aldrete-Davila, however,
was struck only once and returned to Mexico by foot.'
5
After Aldrete-Davila escaped, the agents discovered the van
Aldrete-Davila abandoned contained 743 pounds of marijuana.'
6
However, according to uncontested evidence, neither agent was aware
the van contained drugs or even that the driver was in fact entering the
United States illegally.' 7  Compean and another border patrol agent
collected and disposed of the shell-casings from the shots fired. 18 No
oral or written report was filed concerning the shooting, contrary to
Border Patrol Policies.' 9 Rather, Compean filed a brief report that only
7. See H.R. 3093, 110th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, July 26,
2007); see also Bruce Fein, The Pardon Pander, SLATE, July 26, 2006, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2171209/.







15. United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2008).
16. Response of Government, supra note 6.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Ramos, 537 F.3d at 442.
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mentioned the driver of a van contaning marijuana escaped to Mexico,
without reference to the confrontation.2 °
After Aldrete-Davila returned to Mexico, he received medical
attention for the gunshot wound inflicted in the confrontation. 21 The
bullet, however, remained lodged in his body.22 Because Ramos and
Compean were eventually prosecuted for the crime, as discussed below,
and Aldrete-Davila was the victim of a crime in the United States, the
United States Government brought him back to the United States.23
Aldrete-Davila received further treatment for his wound, and the bullet
that was lodged in his body was used as an important piece of evidence.24
In order to secure Aldrete-Davila's cooperation in the prosecution of the
two agents for events surrounding the shooting of Aldrete-Davila and
eventual cover-up, the United States Attorney's office agreed to offer
him immunity relating to the drug offenses.
2 5
B. Prosecution and Conviction
On March 8, 2006, a unanimous jury in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas convicted former border patrol
agents Ramos and Compean of six and eight felony counts, respectively,
for the incidents surrounding and involving the shooting of Aldrete-
Davila.26 The charges for which the two officers were convicted
included assault with a deadly weapon, discharge of a firearm in relation
to a crime of violence, violating the victim's civil rights,27 and tampering
with an official proceeding.28
In October, 2006, Ignacio Ramos was sentenced to eleven years of
incarceration; Jose Alsonso Compean was sentenced to twelve.29 The
two were ordered to report to prison the following January. 30 Ramos and
Compean moved for a new trial, arguing that improper influences were
brought to bear upon the jurors in their case. 31 Apparently, some of the
jurors misled other jurors into believing that the Court would not accept a






26. United States v. Ramos, 481 F. Supp. 2d 717, 718 (W.D. Tex. 2006).
27. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits officers from
shooting a fleeing suspect unless that suspect poses a threat to others. United States v.
Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 2008).
28. Id. at 5.
29. Miguel Bustillo, 2 Border Agents Get Prison, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 2006, at C4.
30. Id.
31. See Ramos, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
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hung jury.32 The misled jurors, thus, changed their votes to achieve
unanimity.3 3 Such allegations of intrinsic influences cannot be used to
impeach a jury's verdict.34 The District Court consequently denied the
motion for a new trial.35 The District Court also denied both Ramos' and
Compean's motions for bond pending appeal because each were
convicted of a crime of violence, and the Court found no "exceptional
reason"36 to grant the requests.37 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit also denied the defendants' applications for release
pending their appeal.38
In July of 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the convictions of Ramos and Compean for all counts
but tampering with an official proceeding.39 For that count, the Court of
Appeals vacated the conviction and remanded for resentencing.40 Upon
remand and resentencing, the sentences of neither Ramos nor Compean
will be significantly reduced. 41 As the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit noted, their conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c),
using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, carries a ten-
42year mandatory sentence. Because the court of appeals upheld that
conviction, each defendant will retain at least a sentence often years.
C. Legislative Response
The convictions of Ramos and Compean have sparked national
debate concerning both the propriety of the convictions and including the
United States' aggressive prosecution of the two. The case has become a
celebrated cause for those who take a hard line against illegal
immigration and advocates of tighter border security, with tens of
32. Id. at 719-20.
33. Id.
34. FED R. EvID. 606(b); see also Ramos, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 720 (noting that
improper statements or coercion of a juror upon fellow jurors are not external influences
allowed by Rule 606(b); rather, these influences are inadmissible evidence that cannot be
used to impeach a verdict).
35. Ramos, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c) (2000) ("A person subject to detention ... may be ordered
released ... if it is clearly shown that there are exceptional reasons why such person's
detention would not be appropriate.").
37. United States v. Ramos, No. EP-05-CR-856-KC (W.D. Tex. 2007), available at
http://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/opinions/cases/ramoscompean/default.asp; United States
v. Compean, No. EP-05-CR-856-KC (W.D. Tex. 2007), available at http://www.txwd.
uscourts.gov/opinions/cases/ramoscompean/default.asp.
38. United States v. Ramos, Compean, No. 06-51489 (5th Cir. 2007), available at
http://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/opinions/cases/ramoscompean/default.asp.
39. United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 466 (5th Cir. 2008).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 4.
42. Id.
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thousands of people signing a petition to support Ramos and Compean.43
Supporters of the two agents have also held events such as candlelight
vigils, and have publicly criticized the convictions.44 The United States
Attorney in the Western District of Texas, Johnny Sutton, has become
something of a pariah for those who oppose the convictions.45 In
response to the criticism, Sutton made a statement that Ramos and
Compean were not "railroaded by some over-zealous prosecutor," and
highlighted that the two patrolmen were found guilty by a unanimous
jury of their peers, after having full opportunity to explain and offer
evidence in the trial that lasted over two weeks.46
Many of those outraged by the convictions of Ramos and Compean
have also been calling for presidential action, imploring President
47George W. Bush to pardon the two officers under his executive power.
Some supporters of Ramos and Compean have even threatened to call for
impeachment proceedings against President Bush if either Ramos or
Compean suffer harm in prison.a Some have interpreted President
Bush's public responses as to imply that he would consider a pardon;
however, President Bush has never explicitly claimed he would pardon
the individuals.49 In early 2007, Justice Department officials stated that
Ramos and Compean were ineligible for a pardon at that time.50 Their
ineligibility was determined according to Justice Department guidelines,
whereby petitioners are not considered for pardon until at least five years
after their conviction.5' Furthermore, a commutation of each man's
sentence is unlikely; such action is usually unavailable for those who are
appealing their convictions.52
Many of the Nation's lawmakers are among those outraged by the
convictions of Ramos and Compean. Absent action by the executive
43. The Nation; Lawmaker Seeks Pardon for Agents; Rep. Hunter Rolls Out a Bill
for Two Ex-Border Officers Convicted of Shooting an Unarmed Drug Smuggler, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, at A13.
44. Darryl Fears, Support Swells for Agents Who Shot Drug Smuggler, WASH. POST,
Feb. 17, 2007, at A02.
45. Richard A. Serrano, U.S. Attorney Put on Defensive; Johnny Sutton's
Prosecution of Two Border Agents in Texas Has Conservatives Up in Arms, L.A. TIMES,
May 14, 2007, at A8.
46. Information Issued by U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Texas on
Oct. 23: Response of U.S. Attorney Johnny Sutton to Sentencing of Border Patrol Agents
Compean, Ramos, U.S. FED NEWS, Oct. 23, 2006.
47. Fears, supra note 44.
48. Id.
49. Rachel L. Swarns, Bush Comments on Agents Who Shot Suspected Drug Dealer,






branch, members of Congress decided to take action on their own. 53 On
July 25, 2007, the House of Representatives used the "power of the
purse" to challenge the convictions of the two agents deemed wrongly
incarcerated. 4  The House attempted this challenge through an
amendment to the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2008, ("the Amendment").55 The Amendment,
sponsored by GOP Representatives Ted Poe, Tom Tancredo, and Duncan
Hunter, essentially decreed that no funds made available to the Bureau of
Prisons shall be used to incarcerate Ignacio Ramos or Jose Alonso
Compean.56 If the appropriations bill with this amendment is passed by
the Senate and signed by the President, it would free Ramos and
Compean from their judicially imposed incarceration for the fiscal year
of 2008. 5v Presumably, the Amendment as drafted would need to be
passed each year thereafter to keep the two out of federal prison.58
Supporters of the Amendment cited many justifications for its
passing.59 Those justifications center on a need to protect the United
States border and to show support for the agents whose job it is to protect
that border. In the debate concerning the Amendment, members of the
House questioned the United States Attorney's exercise of discretion in
prosecuting Ramos and Compean, as well as the decision to grant
immunity to Aldrete-Davila for the apparent drug violations.6 °
Apparently, the hope of the representatives that support the Amendment
is to rectify what they perceive as a miscarriage of justice, a failure so
patent that it requires action from another branch of government.6' Some
lawmakers made strong political cries: implying that releasing the two
would enhance the morale of those agents that secure our borders, and
even making the correlation that if this is not done, the United States
53. See generally 153 CONG. REC. H8467 (2007) (statements of Reps. Culberson,
Hunter, Poe, Tancredo).
54. Al Kamen, Congress Begs Pardon, WASH. POST, July 27, 2007, at A19.
55. H.R. 3093, 110th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, July 26, 2007).
56. Id.
57. Kamen, supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. See 153 CONG. REC. H8467 (2007) (statement of Rep. Poe) ("This case...
happens to deal with two border agents doing their job.... Almost everyone agrees that
this punishment is way out of line."); see also id. (statement of Rep. Culberson) ("[The
agents' incarceration] is patently unfair.... I urge the Members of the House to support
[the amendment] so we can stop the funding... and send as strong as possible a message
to the White House and... to every law enforcement agent in the field that we're proud
of you.") (alteration in original).
60. Id. (statement of Rep. Royce).
61. See id. (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher) ("[Ramos and Compean] were willing to
risk their lives.... We should not.., let them languish in prison as their families go
down into abject poverty.... If we are patriotic Americans it doesn't go to. . . let these
two men languish in prison.") (alteration in original).
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could never win the "war on terror."62 One Representative, expressing
his support for the Amendment, called for his colleagues to "[V]ote for
our country. Vote for our sovereignty, vote for our borders and vote
'yes' for the Poe-Hunter-Tancredo amendment." 63
In debate, opponents of the Amendment challenged its legality,
claiming it was an inappropriate use of Congress's powers. 64  These
lawmakers highlighted that the Amendment essentially challenges the
convictions of the two officers, and the House of Representatives is not
the appropriate forum to challenge a conviction.65  According to the
opponents, if a remedy is proper, the appropriate resolution to this case
lies either in the judiciary through the appeals process or in the executive
through its Constitutional power of pardon.66  According to one
Representative, members of the legislature "ought not to override the
jurisprudence system we've established in this country ... the remedies
in law lie in a court of law, and therefore, this amendment is not
appropriate. 67
III. OVERVIEW
A. Constitutional Separation and Delegation of Power
The federal government of the United States is a government of
delegated powers.68 Thus, in determining the proper authority of each
branch, "[t]he question is not what power the Federal Government ought
to have but what powers in fact have been given by the people" via the
United States Constitution. 69 In this system of delegated power, the three
branches of the Federal Government are interdependent and share some
concurrent authority.7° However, each branch has specific, exclusive
powers granted solely to that branch.71 The separation of powers is one
of the fundamental doctrines of the United States Constitution. Using
this system, the Framers of the Constitution sought to distribute the
central power of government among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches.72 Checks on each branch are maintained through this
62. See id. (statements of Reps. Goode, Culberson).
63. Id. (statement of Rep. Goode) (alteration in original).
64. See id. (statement of Rep. Mollohan).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (statement of Rep. Farr) (alteration in original).
68. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936).
69. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
70. See FISHER, supra note 5, at 3.
71. Id.
72. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 1.
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dual system of shared and independent authority to ensure that no one
branch assumes too much power or authority, and subsequently infringes
on the rights and duties of another.73 The separation of powers between
the branches has a significant, even peculiar, effect on the governmental
institutions.74 Lines are drawn between the branches to foster efficient
distribution among institutions with differing capacities; yet, those lines
are blurred in the fields of shared powers so as to ensure that no one
branch could abuse its power.75
B. Article III-The Judicial Branch
The powers reserved to the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the Federal Government are enumerated in the first three
76Articles of the Constitution. The Constitution vests the judicial power
in the Supreme Court of the United States, while Congress has the power
to establish the lower federal courts.77 The federal courts of the United
States are granted the power to adjudicate all proper cases arising under
the United States Constitution and federal law.
78
C. Article II-The Executive Branch
The executive power of governance is vested in a President via
Article II of the Constitution.79 The powers reserved to the President
include the office's position as Commander in Chief of the armed
forces,80 the power to appoint officials and make treaties with the advice
and consent of the Senate,81 as well as the power to grant pardons and
reprieves to those who have committed offenses against the United
States."
73. Id.
74. See Robert A. Strong, Separation of Powers and Current Relations Between
Congress and the Presidency, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONSTITUTION
AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 24 (Special Committee on Youth Education for
Citizenship, American Bar Association 1990).
75. Id.
76. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 1-2.
77. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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D. Article I-The Legislative Branch
All powers of legislation are granted to the United States
Congress.83 Specifically, the Constitution grants Congress the power to:
lay and collect taxes in order to provide for the functioning of the
government,84 establish rules of naturalization,85 declare war,86 and coin
money,87 among many other powers. Also, Article I, Section Nine of the
Constitution prohibits Congress from taking certain actions.8  For
example, Congress may neither pass a bill of attainder or ex post facto
law, 89 nor may it suspend the writ of habeas corpus except in cases of
rebellion or invasion.
90
E. Congress's Spending and Appropriations Powers
Congress has the "power of the purse" pursuant to Article I, Section
Nine of the Constitution. The relevant clause provides that "[n]o Money
shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law." 9' Appropriations are types of legislation that confer
spending authority to the executive branch.92 The Constitution grants
broad spending power to Congress. 93 Article I, Section Eight provides
that, "[t]he Congress shall have the Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imports and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States., 94 In other
words, Congress is expressly authorized to tax in order to provide for the
general welfare.95 The power to appropriate, found in Section Nine, does
not specifically say that the funds are to be appropriated for the general
welfare. 96 However, such an interpretation is necessary because funds
collected through taxation may only be spent through appropriations.97
Certainly, the requirement that the spending be related to the common
defense or general welfare gives Congress broad authority to appropriate
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
88. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (alteration in original).
92. Kate Stith, Separation of Powers and the Power of the Purse, in CONTEMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONSTITUTION AND SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 74, at 19.
93. Id.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (alteration in original).





funds for nearly anything.98 Under this power, therefore, Congress's use
of the "power of the purse" to authorize expenditures is not limited to the
direct, specific areas over which the Legislature is granted power
elsewhere in the Constitution.99 By using the spending power, Congress
has the ability to indirectly exercise influence over areas in which it does
not have direct or enumerated power.'
00
F. Limitations on the "Power of the Purse"
However, there are limitations on the spending power that arise
from the Constitution itself.'0 ' Pursuant to the "independent bar"
doctrine, Congress would abuse the spending power if it "exercised [it]
for ends inconsistent with the limited grants of power in the
Constitution."'' 0 2 Thus, although Congress has discretion in respect to the
spending power, it may not use that power to usurp another branch's
enumerated domain.1
0 3
G. The President's Pardon Power
Article II, Section Two of the Constitution specifically grants the
President the power to issue a pardon for any crime committed against
the United States. 10 4 The power to pardon is one of the few powers
granted exclusively to the executive branch by Article II of the United
States Constitution.' °5 This power entails the ability to reduce a person's
sentence after commission or conviction of a federal crime.1
0 6
The President can choose the form the pardon will take: whether
the pardon will exonerate the individual or simply commute the
individual's sentence. 10 7  Traditionally, a pardon has the effect of
excusing the individual for the criminal act, "so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offen[se]."'
0 8
98. Stith, supra note 92, at 19.
99. See Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (holding that Congress is not limited to
spending only to achieve specific objectives listed in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution).
100. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) ("These cases establish that
the 'independent Constitutional bar' limitation on the spending power is not, as petitioner
suggests, a prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not
empowered to achieve directly.").
101. See generally Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869).
102. Id. at 541 (alteration in original).
103. See id.
104. U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 1.
105. FISHER, supra note 5, at 11.
106. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 364.
107. Id.
108. Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1867) (alteration in original).
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On the other hand, a pardon can merely reduce a sentence through a
commutation. 0 9 In this instance, the offender's sentence is reduced or
terminated, yet that person is not entirely excused of the crime." 0 The
President also has the ability to issue a pardon that is effective only upon
satisfaction of a condition by the individual or to issue a pardon that
grants clemency for a class of people."' The President's pardon power
is exceedingly broad, and "[i]t extends to every offence known to the
law, and may be exercised at any time after its commission."' 12
H. Limitations on the Pardon Power
This power is subject to only one proscription concerning the crime
in the Constitution: the President may not grant pardons in cases of
impeachment. 1 3 The President's pardon power, subject to the express
limitation concerning cases of impeachment, therefore "extends to every
[criminal] offen[se] known to the law." ' 14 A pardon may neither absolve
an offender of civil liability, 1 5 nor may the pardon involve withdrawing
money from the treasury without an act of Congress authorizing such
withdrawal."l 6  Otherwise, pardons are not subject to control by the
Legislature. 117 Congress may neither limit the effect of a pardon' 18 nor
identify a class of offenders that are ineligible for pardons. 19 The power
to pardon an individual or group of individuals, in whatever form, lies
only in the purview of the powers of the President.
What happens when one branch infringes upon the power or duties
of another? Often, improper exercise of power is attempted under the
guise of an application of proper, expressly granted authority. 120  For
109. FISHER, supra note 5, at 11.
110. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 365; see also Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480
(1927) (holding that the president has the authority to commute a death sentence to life
imprisonment).
111. WILLARD H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 22
(American Council on Pub. Affairs 1941).
112. Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (alteration in original).
113. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 1.
114. Garland, 71 U.S. at 380 (alteration in original).
115. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 365; see also Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87,
111 (1925) (asserting the President may grant a pardon for criminal contempt, but not for
civil contempt as the former is punitive and in the public interest, while the latter is
remedial and in the interest of the opponent in civil litigation).
116. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877).
117. Garland, 71 U.S. at 380.
118. Id.; see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872) (holding that Congress
may not infringe on the President's Constitutional power to grant pardons).
119. Garland, 71 U.S. at 380.
120. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
The President at the time had seized steel mills, justifying such action as a duty of the
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example, the President has invoked his duty to act as Commander in
Chief to justify unconstitutional measures taken, particularly when the
nation is facing divisive times.121 Granted, sometimes exercising power
in an area over which a branch does not have direct constitutional control
is appropriate.122 As mentioned before, the Supreme Court has held that
Congress can constitutionally use appropriations to achieve goals that are
not directly within its constitutionally mandated duties. 23 However, this
type of indirect exercise of authority is entirely inappropriate when
another provision of the Constitution provides an independent bar to such
action. 124 In this situation, even separate branches working concurrently
to expand the power of one single branch would nonetheless be an
exercise barred by the Constitution.
1 25
IV. ANALYSIS
Pursuant to the power to appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the nation, the House of Representatives passed an amendment that
would presumably free Ignacio Ramos and Jose Alonso Compean. 126
This action, taken by the Legislature, implicates the roles and powers of
the other branches. Whether this action interferes with the role of the
judiciary, (as the two were duly convicted in a District Court), is beyond
the scope of this Comment. This analysis will focus on how
congressional action through appropriations legislation in this instance
interacts with the role of the executive branch and whether the action
infringes on a power allocated solely to the Executive: the power to grant
pardons.
Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. However, such action was strictly within the
power of the Legislature. Id.
121. See id. (holding that a presidential order directing the government to seize steel
mills was not within the president's Constitutional authority as commander of the
military or other powers of that office).
122. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Congress may
attach certain requirements relating to a minimum drinking age to receipt of federal
funds, while not addressing whether Congress can mandate a minimum drinking age
upon the states).
123. See id. (noting that Congress may indirectly achieve certain objectives through
the use of appropriations).
124. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) ("Any limitations upon that
exercise of granted power must be found elsewhere in the Constitution.").
125. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (holding that the Line
Item Veto Act, by which Congress granted the President the authority to cancel
provisions in budgetary acts, was not authorized by the Constitution).
126. The Amendment directs that no funds shall be used to enforce either the
judgments or the sentences of the two. See H.R. 3093, 110th Cong. (as passed by House
of Representatives, July 26, 2007).
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Congress has wide latitude in appropriations; providing for the
general welfare and common defense is a broad formulation, 2 7 and
Congress is often given wide discretion in legislation. 128 Clearly, there is
no direct authority in the Constitution that allows Congress to question
the incarceration of an individual. 29  However, indirect exercises of
power not expressly granted by means of appropriations can be
legitimate.1 30  More importantly, though, these means must not be
prohibited by other provisions of the Constitution. 131 The
characterization of the Amendment would likely determine its validity:
whether it is merely a spending provision aimed at providing for the
general welfare, an action authorized by the constitution, or whether it is
a form of congressional pardon, an action independently barred by the
Constitution.
A. The Spending Power
No money may be drawn from the Treasury unless pursuant to an
act of Congress that allocates the spending authority for that money.
1 32
The Constitution allows Congress to raise money, and then appropriate
that money to provide for the general welfare of the United States.
133
B. Using the "Power of the Purse" to Indirectly Achieve Objectives
Using funds to provide for the general welfare of the nation grants
Congress broad spending authority. 34  Congress may, theoretically,
appropriate funds for nearly anything, including areas in which it does
not have direct authority, as long as the ultimate goal is for the general
welfare. 135  However, this power is not unlimited.1 36  Congress may
indirectly achieve objectives by appropriations in areas over which it
127. Stith, supra note 92, at 19.
128. "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
129. Although, the converse may be implied. There is authority in the Constitution
that prohibits Congress from directing legislation against an individual as punishment;
the prohibition on Bills of Attainder. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
130. See discussion infra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
131. See discussion infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
132. Stith, supra note 92, at 19.
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
134. Stith, supra note 92, at 19.
135. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that, although Congress
may not have direct authority to mandate a national minimum drinking age, Congress
may attach related conditions to the receipt of federal funds).
136. Id. at 207 (noting that the spending power is limited by restrictions articulated by
the courts and by the Constitution itself).
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does not have control, but may not act in areas that are elsewhere
prohibited by the Constitution.'
1 37
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate.., are
constitutional."
' 138
The Supreme Court addressed this indirect exercise of control by
Congress in South Dakota v. Dole.'39 South Dakota permitted persons 19
years of age or older to purchase alcohol.140  However, an act of
Congress reduced federal highway funding to states with a minimum
drinking age below 21.141 South Dakota sued the United States and
challenged the law, claiming that it violated both the Twenty-First
Amendment and Congress's spending power in Article I, Section
Eight. 
142
South Dakota contended that Congress was attempting to directly
legislate a national drinking age via the law, an action that should be
barred by the Twenty-First Amendment. 143 The Supreme Court did not
address whether such an action would be prohibited by the
Constitution. 144  Rather, the Court noted that Congress had acted
indirectly, (as opposed to directly), under the spending power to
encourage uniformity in drinking ages; the law did not mandate a
minimum age. 145
In addressing the constitutionality of the indirect exercise of
authority, the Court noted that Congress's power to authorize
expenditure of public monies is not unlimited.1 46 However, the spending
need not be limited solely to objectives found within the "enumerated
legislative fields" of Article I. 147 Such expenditures must be "in pursuit
of the general welfare," and conditions attached to the spending must be
related to this particular interest.148 Moreover, these expenditures will be
appropriate unless another provision of the Constitution provides an
137. Id.
138. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (alteration in original).
139. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
140. Id. at 205.
141. Id.; see 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2007).
142. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
143. Id. at 206.
144. Id. ("[W]e need not decide in this case whether that Amendment would prohibit
an attempt by Congress to legislate directly a national minimum drinking age.").
145. Id.
146. Id. at 207.
147. Id. at 206 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
148. Id. at 207.
20081
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
independent bar. 149 The Court held that this conditional grant of federal
funds did fall within the ambit of providing for the general welfare.1 50
Further, as the law merely encouraged state action and did not mandate a
national minimum drinking age, it was not prohibited elsewhere in the
Constitution, specifically the Twenty-First Amendment. 5'
In United States v. American Library Association, the Supreme
Court addressed the constitutionality of provisions of an Act of Congress
which prohibited federal assistance for internet access unless the library
agreed to install filtering software. 52  A group of libraries, library
associations, and others sued in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania challenging these provisions of the
Children's Internet Protection Act. 53 The group argued, and the District
Court agreed, that Congress exceeded its authority under Article I,
Section Eight of the Constitution because compelling a library or a
patron to filter information would necessarily violate the First
Amendment.1 54 Using the "power of the purse" to effect a content-based
restriction on speech, according to the District Court, was an
unconstitutional use of Congress's Spending Power.'
55
In overturning the decision of the District Court, the Supreme Court
noted that, while Congress may not compel an entity to engage in
unconstitutional activity, Congress does have "wide latitude to attach
conditions" to federal funds in order to further the objectives of
providing for the general welfare of the nation. 56 Because the provisions
in question did not regulate private conduct, but rather receipt of federal
funds, the Supreme Court applied the same framework as used in South
Dakota v. Dole.'57 The Court mentioned that the government does have
broad discretion in deciding what private speech to make public based
upon its content. 158  The Court ruled that, in this instance, the
government was not compelling unconstitutional activity by prohibiting
funding in the absence of a filtering provision. 159 Rather, Congress was
insisting that the federal funds be spent within the limits of the program
under which they were appropriated. 60 The Court therefore reversed the
149. Id. at 208.
150. Id.
151. Id. at212.
152. 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
153. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2003).
154. Id. at 202.
155. Id. at 202-03.




160. Id. at 212.
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decision of the District Court, holding that because the Act neither
violated First Amendment rights nor induced libraries to do so, such a
condition was within Congress's power to regulate pursuant to the
spending power. 161
C. The Independent Bar
The Supreme Court directly addressed the confines of Congress's
Spending Power in United States v. Butler. 62 The Court noted that there
have historically been different views as to whether Congress's power to
tax and appropriate is limited to the constitutionally enumerated fields, or
whether that power is in fact broader. 163 The Court ultimately decided
that "[w]hile, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines are
set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which bestow
and define the legislative powers of the Congress."' 64  Therefore,
Congress's power to appropriate money for the general welfare of the
nation is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power.'
65
While Congress does have broad power to spend according to this
interpretation, that power is by no means unlimited. 166 The power to tax
and spend must be in pursuit of the general welfare and must not be
exercised in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution. 167 In this
particular case, provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933
were being challenged. 68 Provisions of the Act authorized levying a tax
on processing cotton, the proceeds of which were appropriated to aid in
crop control in order to reduce crop production and raise prices. 169 The
Court ultimately held that the Act was an unconstitutional assertion of
Congressional power and that the tax imposed by this Act was invalid.
170
The power to tax may be broad, and Congress may be given a certain
degree of discretion in fashioning appropriate means. 17  Taxation may
be used as a means to carry out another power expressly granted.172 But,
using the appropriate means through powers granted to reach a
prohibited end may never be within the power of Congress. 173
161. Id. at 214.
162. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
163. Id. 66-67.
164. Id. at 67 (alteration in original).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 68.
168. Id. at 53.
169. Id. at 58-60.
170. See Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936).
171. Id. at 67.
172. Id. at 69.
173. Id.
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"To the Executive Alone is Entrusted the Power of Pardon."
174
Congress does have broad powers with appropriations as long as the
ends are within the constitutional bounds of legislative control. 7 ' The
power to pardon is one area in which Congress may not interfere
pursuant to legislation.176  The Supreme Court noted that only the
President has the power to issue pardons.1 77 As this power is granted
solely to the President, any attempt by Congress to interfere with the
President's discretion in this field would infringe on that constitutionally
granted power.178  The Court has held that Congress cannot
constitutionally detract from the legal effect of a pardon. 79 In United
States v. Klein, the Court addressed an Act of Congress that essentially
did just that; provisions of the Abandoned and Captured Property Act
declared that any person who "aided the rebellion" or was guilty of
disloyalty could not avail themselves of their subsequent pardon to
negate the prior disloyalty.1 80  Basically, a pardon was supposed to be
used to prove the person provided "aid and comfort to the rebellion,"
thus justifying United States' capture of their private property. 81 But,
that person's pardon, while absolving them of the crime, did not restore
their rights in that property.1 82 The Court found that this rule required
courts to "receive special pardons as evidence of guilt [of the accused]
and to treat them as null and void. [The court] is required to disregard
pardons... and to deny them their legal effect."1 83 Such a result was
constitutionally unacceptable as it "impair[ed] the executive authority
and direct[ed] the court to be instrumental to that end."
'184
174. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1872) (alteration in original).
175. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 205 (1987).
176. Klein, 80 U.S. at 147 ("[T]he President's power of pardon is not subject to
legislation." (emphasis added)).
177. Id. at 147 ("To the executive alone is [sic] entrusted the power of pardon; and it
is granted without limit.").
178. Id. ("Now it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon
any more than the executive can change a law.").
179. Id.
180. Id. at 143-44. This controversy took place after the Civil War. The President
subsequently issued many pardons for those who were "disloyal;" most of which were
conditional pardons that required a pledge of loyalty. See id.
181. Id.
182. Id. ("The substance of this enactment is that an acceptance of a pardon.., shall
be conclusive evidence of the acts pardoned, but shall be null and void as evidence of the
rights conferred by it.").
183. Id. at 147 (alteration in original).




The constitutionality of the Amendment, denying funds to
incarcerate two duly-convicted individuals, may depend upon how the
Amendment is characterized. "To the President alone is [e]ntrusted the
power of pardon.. ; 185 but, through appropriations, Congress has the
power to legislate nearly anything. 186 The ultimate constitutionality of
Congress's action depends upon whether the Amendment is simply a
general spending provision designed to provide for the general welfare of
the nation, or if it is, in fact, a Congressional pardon of Ramos and
Compean. 1
87
Promoting the General Welfare of the Nation
If this provision is merely legislation aimed at promoting the
general welfare of the nation, then it likely would pass a constitutional
analysis as an exercise of Congress's power to indirectly achieve goals
not otherwise explicitly authorized by the Constitution. 88 Congress's
decision to spend public funds is not limited to the "enumerated
legislative fields" found in the Constitution.18 9 If Congress is permitted
to tax for the general welfare and common defense, then Congress should
also be allowed to spend for that welfare and defense. 90 And, the
Representatives of the people are best suited to determine what
provisions in fact would provide for the general welfare of the Nation.' 91
The supporters of the Amendment validate its propriety as
providing for the general welfare of the nation. Their justifications
primarily center on the strong message that will be sent by denying the
funds to incarcerate Ramos and Compean, two people they believe to be
victims of the failures of the justice system: that those who represent the
Nation's lawmakers will not stand for this perceived miscarriage of
justice.192 The supporters intend the bill to send this message to both the
people of the nation and to the agents who protect the nation's borders. 1
93
185. Id.
186. Stith, supra note 92, at 19.
187. Or, the effect of the Amendment could amount to a commutation of sentence,
which would also be constitutionally suspect.
188. See discussion supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
189. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (quoting United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)).
190. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
191. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 413 (1914) ("What makes
for the general welfare is necessarily in the first instance a matter of legislative
judgment ... ").
192. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H8467 (2007) (statement of Rep. Culberson).
193. See id.
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One Representative noted the outrage among the American populace
regarding the convictions of the two agents:
194
[E]very American is born with an innate sense of fairness.... I have
never seen a level of outrage among my constituents and really across
the country.... Every American understands this case .... We
cannot as Members of Congress send a stronger signal... to the
American people how committed we are to protecting this border and
standing behind our law enforcement agents.... We understand
clearly that we will never win the war on terror until we have truly
protected our borders. 
195
Apparently, the Amendment will not only send a message to the
American people, but also to those agents who are trusted to perform the
significant duty of protecting the United States' borders. 196 "By voting
for this amendment to free these men, Congress will not only be
correcting a terrible mistake, it will begin repairing the morale and
effectiveness of our Border Patrol that have been damaged by [the
prosecution of these agents]. 197 With such marketable slogans being
used in debate, it is not hard to see why those who have to answer to
their constituency would pass such an amendment.
Granted, nowhere in the Constitution does it say that Congress may
legislate to improve the morale of the nation and those who protect it.
198
However, Congress's spending is authorized to provide for the general
welfare.' 99  If promoting the morale, (which, according to certain
Representatives would result in more secure borders and a "win" on the
war on terror), can amount to the general welfare, then appropriating
money to do so would likely be constitutionally sound. But, one must
nonetheless ensure that the broad power of the purse is not elsewhere
circumscribed by the Constitution.z°°
Potential Pardon, Independent Bar
If, on the contrary, the Amendment amounts to a Congressional
pardon, then the legislation should be barred by the "independent bar"
doctrine.0 1 Congress may never use even explicitly authorized means,
(the power to appropriate), to reach an end prohibited by the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. (statement of Rep. Royce).
197. Id. (alteration in original).
198. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I.
199. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
200. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987).
201. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) ("Any limitations upon that
exercise of granted power must be found elsewhere in the Constitution.").
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Constitution. °2 For example, Congress may not appropriate funds if the
result would amount to a bill of attainder.20 3 Nor may Congress legislate
in a manner that would interfere with the power granted directly, and
only to the President: the power to grant pardons. 0 4 This power is "not
subject to legislation" by Congress.2 °5
Some opponents of the Amendment expressed their concern that it
was not a provision that merely promoted the general welfare; rather, the
Amendment would serve to second-guess the convictions of the two
agents and subsequently pardon the two.20 6 Effecting a pardon, by no
means, is an acceptable role of the Legislature.2 °7 Even proponents of
the Amendment recognize that the power to pardon lies within the
President.20 8 But, because the President has not done so, the proponents
suggest that it is now their role to "intervene in cases where we
[determine] that the outcome was something we [do] not agree with. 20 9
While not minimizing the affective position of the other
representatives, opponents of the Amendment expressed that such
intervention was beyond the power of the Legislature. 210 According to
one Representative,
This issue ought to be resolved in the courts surely, or if the President
of the United States wanted to take it up he has the power that we
don't have.... [The President] has a pardoning power. [Congress
does not] have that here, but in effect, we are attempting to act as if
we did here with these two amendments.
211
At least one Representative suggested that taking action to challenge a
proper conviction would "override the jurisprudence system that we've
established in this country," a result that is unacceptable.2 12
If the provision would amount to a pardon given by the Legislature,
it would certainly be an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's
appropriations power. The Constitution grants solely to the President the
202. See Butler, 297 U.S. at 69.
203. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). The Supreme Court held an
act of Congress that excluded certain individuals from government employment served as
a bill of attainder. "Legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to name
individuals.., as to inflict punishment... are bills of attainder prohibited by the U.S.
Constitution." Id. at 315.
204. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1872).
205. Id.
206. See 153 CONG. REc. H8467 (2007) (statement of Rep. Mollohan).
207. See id.
208. See id. (statement of Rep. Tancredo) ("We have begged the President to please
become involved with this, please pardon, please commute.").
209. Id.
210. See id. (statement of Rep. Mollohan).
211. Id.
212. Id. (statement of Rep. Farr).
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power to pardon,213 and established law has consistently held that
Congress may not interfere with that power.214 Whether it be an attempt
to limit the President's power to pardon, to mandate the class of persons
who may or may not be pardoned, or to take the law in their own
hands-Congress may not themselves assume role of the Executive and
meddle with the pardoning power.215
V. CONCLUSION
Congress' authority in appropriations is a powerful tool. The
Legislature may achieve objectives not typically within the realm of
legislative power through use of the power of the purse.216 As long as
the spending is reasonable to achieve an end not prohibited by the
Constitution, Congress has wide discretion in how they choose to
appropriate funds from the Treasury.217 The appropriate means must not,
however, be used to reach a prohibited end: the power of the purse may
not be used to usurp the power of another branch.218
Whether denying funds to incarcerate two individuals is within the
purview of Congressional power depends on how such a provision is
characterized. If this action can somehow be construed as only a means
to provide for the general welfare or defense of the nation, 19 then the
Amendment would likely fall within Congress's broad discretion to
spend. However, the Amendment would, presumably, have the effect of
releasing from incarceration two individuals who were duly convicted by
a jury of their peers-the same effect that would result from an actual
pardon or commutation granted by the President of the United States.
220
Because "[t]o the executive alone is [sic] entrusted the power of pardon,"
such an end would be an impermissible infringement by Congress upon
the power and role of the Executive.221
213. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
214. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1872); see also Exparte Garland,
71 U.S. 333, 380 (1867).
215. Id.
216. See discussion supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
217. See discussion supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
218. See discussion supra notes 175-83 and accompanying text.
219. For example, supporters could characterize the goals of improving morale in
order to better protect the borders as providing for both the general welfare and common
defense.
220. This Comment will not address the implications of the Amendment if it does, in
fact, amount to a Congressional pardon. An interesting topic to consider is, if the
Amendment were to be signed into law as drafted, how such an exercise of power could
be challenged. Presumably, the Amendment would be challenged in the courts of the
United States. However, it does not seem clear who exactly would have standing to
challenge the amendment.
221. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1872) (alteration in original).
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